The meaning of “zombie” via any consciousness-type theory suggests the existence of a non-conscious version of an individual animal – programmed to perfectly imitate every aspect of an individual’s human/animal behaviour; a perfect copy of yourself for example, but which is not conscious; impossible to distinguish from the real you.
Think "Venus Flytrap" the fly eating plants – not conscious to any known extent, but maybe they fool some animals into believing they are conscious.
So, how could a non–conscious animal fulfill the criteria of evolution which concerns the survival of the fittest, starting with the requirement to eat food...
Only the subroutines that mutate to become successful eating routines live on and lead to reproduction. This would have to include various interrelated software-type functions, such as a governing/monitoring process which activates the food selection and eating routines accordingly.
One might suggest that conscious sensations need to exist as the driving force in evolutionary behaviour, but let's not be fooled into overlooking that sensations cannot in themselves influence behaviour without true free will acting on those feelings, such as hunger.
Different amounts of consciousness exist for different animals – in general, significantly smaller animals such as insects only have low levels of subjective conscious experiences, whereas animals like cats, dogs, and humans... all have a great deal.
For convenience, the term “free will component” is used hereafter to refer to the existence of any amount of true (“folk definition”) free will, whether it be miniscule or large...
Alternatively, free will (choice) can be considered to exist as a property of our sensations (merged with them), which would then mean that our sensations are independent of our brain’s behavioural actions – but the question of exactly how “choice” can exist remains a mystery, regardless of where we decide to place the actual “free” component in our analysis of conscious existence.
Therefore, insisting that a subjective conscious experience of sensations is required as an influence for evolutionary behaviour to succeed, is to also 100% commit to accepting that free will exists – but consider that it is impossible for true free will to have a logical existence, i.e., free logic?
In other words, the inner workings of such a truly free “component” cannot have a logical description.
Even though the majority of actions performed by the brain might to a significant extent be autonomous... “truly free” (not random) either exists or it doesn't, no matter how miniscule.
Consider how our subjective experiences relate to our survival behaviour – autonomous survival behaviour – if free will doesn't exist, then it means all of our actions happen automatically, i.e., without choice.
That would mean the subjective conscious experience of pain serves no purpose.
In which case the conscious experience of injuring yourself could have evolved to feel nice... or simply no feeling.
It would mean the feeling of hunger didn't evolve to encourage your free will to choose to eat.
Why have feelings and sensations evolved that correspond correctly for evolution to succeed based on free will acting via conscious subjective experience... if free will does not exist?
“Panpsychism”... one version of this idea considers each type of particle as having its own distinctive miniscule conscious experience, which have added up to become something significant via evolution.
“Panprotopsychism”... similarly considers such an accumulative result, but rather than each particle being conscious on its own, it becomes conscious when part of a larger group of particles – a type of emergentism.
However, the question remains – why would particles that have miniscule levels of consciousness combine to produce the correct conscious experience for evolution to succeed... if free will does not exist?
Example: 10 particles hang out together in some animal's body in preparation for whenever it requires rehydration. They position themselves relative to each other such that the feeling of thirst emerges whenever the hydration level drops below a certain threshold value...
The brain’s various drinking subroutines recognise the logical arrangement of the 10 particles and initiate the action of looking for liquids that are suitable for consumption whenever the threshold is reached...
Notice that the drinking-type subroutines completely ignore the subjective conscious experiences of thirst, and instead act directly on the particle’s relative positions to each other, i.e., the patterns they produce.
Moreover, the drinking-type subroutines have no way of experiencing (interacting) with the thirst sensations, and even if they did... the sensations generated by the patterns which in turn stimulate the drinking routines, are either an unnecessary indirect step in the process, or they advantageously stimulate other subroutines – but the conscious subjective experience of such a thirst influencing field would serve no purpose within itself.
Regions of brain activity related to controlling some particular bodily movement have been shown to be active before the brain activity that produces the conscious awareness of the bodily movement.
In other words, by conducting MRI scans which produce neuroimaging measurements, it reveals that unconscious parts of the brain appear to be making decisions before we become consciously aware of making the decision via choice, i.e., free will – therefore how is it possible to make such decisions if they happen before we become aware of them – the situation seems to be happening in the reverse order.
The so-called “readiness potential” is brain activity that occurs prior to the brain activity associated with consciousness awareness.
However, according to Peter Ulric Tse (in the above video), readiness potential can occur – but without leading to the physical action ever happening (“even in the absence of a motor act”).
Therefore, such brain activity might not complete the full decision-making process on its own – the final trigger might involve parts of the brain that are conscious, although not necessarily in every situation, e.g., simple situations such as moving a limb might not require the go-ahead... whereas more involved considerations about life might require cooperation from conscious regions of the brain that involve free will (choice) – either via direct physical existence as postulated by panpsychism, or via an influential process not yet understood, the so-called dualistic agent – the animal's inner decision-making self-being.
The video also explores ideas about how free will might exist in varying degrees of control, i.e., when you decide something... to what extent are you acting as an automaton... vs free will – if it exists?
Quote: “...the problem is that we all have experiences; conscious experiences of making up our minds; of deciding something, where we experience a kind of causal gap. I have reasons for voting for a particular candidate in an election; reasons against voting for that candidate; but all the same at the end of the day, I have to make up my mind...”
The chain of events that lead to and influence moments in our lives are often completely out of our control, although not always – our decisions can of course result in events that lead right back to us...
Example: cutting back from putting 3 sugars into your coffee to only having 2, could lead to you getting up from the settee and walking back into the kitchen to add 1 more – because you overestimated the taste in sweetness... or maybe you just changed your mind.
Ultimately however, the extent to which any chain of events leads to us deciding about something, has nothing to do with the question of whether true free will really exists, i.e., the ability to truly choose – which must be represented by changing patterns in brain chemistry that have occurred independent of deterministic (or random) cause and effect.
Quote: “... quantum indeterminacy is randomness, and free decision-making is not random... okay, now formally speaking that commits a fallacy, that argument; the fallacy of composition; of supposing features that were little things, must be features of the big things that the consciousness is made of...
But to avoid that you’d have to say something that doesn’t sound very plausible; you’d have to say – the quantum indeterminacy, which is random at the sub-molecular level, gives rise to, through causal processes in producing consciousness – consciousness that inherits the indeterminacy of the quantum level… without inheriting the randomness… now, if that isn’t enough to keep a philosopher awake at night, I don’t know what is...”
In other words: randomness meaning that our decisions are not predetermined... but the end result; the consciousness itself, is not actually random – the “gap” (missing link) in this case seems to exist somewhere between the primary quantum random state of existence, and the deterministic behaviour of matter that follows-on via larger size physical structures – or maybe the gap resides at the other side of random existence, i.e., between non-physical existence and physical randomness, influencing the seemingly random phenomenon.
The so-called “gap” represents the missing link between any theory about how free will works, and the actual existence of free will – albeit the truth is perhaps beyond the comprehension of consciousness itself, i.e., truth in this respect is at best... only available to us philosophically... simply out of our reach; non-applicable (incompatible) with any possible understanding that we can ever have...
Or is there no “gap” – might the free “component” be an intrinsic property of matter’s existence via the wave function itself, i.e., free-ness actually resides characteristically in the existence of the wave before it even collapses – or maybe every single particle is actually conscious just a tiny little bit, as suggested by various types of panpsychism.
Regardless of how consciousness exists via technical description, it’s clear that all aspects of consciousness are effectively merged together to form one overall subjective conscious experience.
Quote: “Okay I’ll be brief about compatibilism; it seems to me a cop-out – the compatibilist says... well sure everything’s determined... it’s just, let’s continue to use the vocabulary of free will...”
“There are some kind of determined actions, where they’re determined by causes inside my brain, and we’ll call those free – and that as far as ordinary language usage is concerned; that’s probably okay; that is, we say I did it of my own free will, where of course it may be completely determined... compatibilism is just an evasion...”
Although the term “compatibilism” might seem convenient for labelling how we all talk about making decisions – it’s probably far more likely to cause confusion – true free will either exists or it doesn't... there really is no in-between.
Sam provides a thorough insight into how causal behaviour starts at various distant events, which in turn lead to affecting the inner workings of the brain.
The bulk of a persons so-called “decision-making processes” are influenced by circumstances that are entirely out of their control – the concept of true free will is the ability to make a truly free choice... in the moment, e.g., you’re faced with the option of going swimming with friends – yes or no? ...
Both seem like valid choices – on the one hand you really want to go; but on the other hand, you have some homework to finish off – there are pros and cons either way, and the exact consequences of going swimming are not clear...
Occasionally on Friday's the pool gets extremely busy, which you don't particularly like.
You've also been asked by another group of friends to go out for food and drinks at your local restaurant.
You estimate it'll take between 2 to 3 hours to finish your homework, which means staying up later than usual.
You feel it's a 50/50 decision... but what will you decide?
See: 38:20 to 38:27 “... yes you are free to do what you want even now, but where do your wants come from?”
Although, the above quote is somewhat misleading – stating being “free” contradicts the claim that free will does not exist.
Sam suggests that free will does not exist, based on all of the biological processes in the brain, either happening purely deterministically or involving randomness, and therefore free will has no logical or physical basis for existing.
Example: why exactly does an electron orbit the nucleus? ... or rather, why exactly does an electron exist as a probabilistic wave in the shape of an “orbital”?
Free != Logic.
Logic is deterministic cause and effect.
Random is positional change that does not follow logic.
There exists no logical reason why existence itself exists.
Existence that does not exist via logical description is mysterious.
If the laws of physics are considered to exist as influential phenomena that govern all of the physical interactions in existence, then even though such laws are not physical in themselves, they are indeed dynamic.
Denying that the laws of physics actually exist, is to say that all physical existence requires no logical reason for behaving the way it does – which is logical because such a reason would require a reason for its own existence.
Point 6 seems to suffice as an explanation for how (why) physical existence behaves.
Point 7 contradicts Point 6 by asserting that a never-ending chain of explanations is required.
Therefore, there are no definitive reasons for physical behaviour occurring, i.e., logically neutral.
There are no reasons for why random and deterministic behaviours exist... but we demand a reason for the existence of “free will”
Considering free will (choice) to exist via panpsychism, i.e., the truly free behaviour of particles, whether they be the complex arrangements of particles that give rise to consciousness, or even particles that belong to other areas of brain activity – begs the question – what are the logical reasons that would explain such truly free-moving particles? ... but Point 10 above concludes that no such logical reasons exist... not even for deterministic behaviour.
Karim Fifel: Journal of Neuroscience 24 January 2018 (Laboratory of Neurophysiology, Molecular Cell Biology Department) “Readiness Potential and Neuronal Determinism: New Insights on Libet Experiment” ... the last paragraph is quoted below:
“Although the philosophical implications of these results are open for debate, neural determinism defined as the mediation of all mental states by brain processes is the inevitable paradigm, even if we assume the centrality of conscious awareness in action control. This view, however, remains compatible with both physicalism (i.e., all mental states are caused by brains) and interactionism (i.e., brain and mind, while distinct and independent, exert causal effects on one another). This makes the philosophical debate about free will and determinism in a state of underdetermination by current neuroscientific findings. Consequently, and referring to the quotation that started this essay, we might conclude by saying that: Neuroscience may in no way interfere with our first-person experience of the will, it can in the end only describe it … it leaves everything as it is.”
Neuroscientist Walter Jackson Freeman III ... “our intentional actions continually flow into the world, changing the world and the relations of our bodies to it” – See last but one sentence as quoted below:
See the “Overview” 5th paragraph: “The discovery that humans possess a determined will would have implications for moral responsibility or lack thereof.[20] Neuroscientist and author Sam Harris believes that we are mistaken in believing the intuitive idea that intention initiates actions. In fact, Harris is even critical of the idea that free will is "intuitive": he says careful introspection can cast doubt on free will. Harris argues: "Thoughts simply arise in the brain. What else could they do? The truth about us is even stranger than we may suppose: The illusion of free will is itself an illusion".[21] Neuroscientist Walter Jackson Freeman III, nevertheless, talks about the power of even unconscious systems and actions to change the world according to our intentions. He writes: "our intentional actions continually flow into the world, changing the world and the relations of our bodies to it. This dynamic system is the self in each of us, it is the agency in charge, not our awareness, which is constantly trying to keep up with what we do."[22] To Freeman, the power of intention and action can be independent of awareness.”
Imagine being presented with (experiencing) a sensation, and then making a decision (acting) based on how that sensation feels – this is you, the agent, the kind-of unconscious aspect of your existence that in itself does not exist as your actual sensations... but rather you exist as the decision-making entity that decides based on your current subjective conscious state of experience – two examples:
Some sensation emerges a fraction of a second after your brain starts to process some thought (data; information) – you being the entity (which is not yet understood in terms of existence) either interfaces with the physical brain via you existing as some unknown force of nature – or you exist directly as the free-moving intrinsic nature of particles that have formed into becoming the extremely complex structures of your brain, i.e., free will (choice) is an intrinsic characteristic of physical existence itself – just as consciousness itself is thought to exist as an intrinsic nature via panpsychism – discussed further down this page.
Circumstances in your life, lead to you (the agent) being presented with the conscious sensation that accompanies your brain's information processing of an advert on TV which is advertising “Chicago Town Pizza” – the sensation of temptation that you are presented with is quite pleasant, and so you (the agent) make (initiate the action of) the decision (data processing) to go shopping.
The idea of an evolved zombie human in terms of eating for example, would be for the brain's relevant software routines to have developed via mutating – the successful mutations are the ones that compute good food choices, which are also activated when necessary – such a zombie is completely without any conscious experience of its own.
Three options are:
Zombie humans.
Humans with consciousness but without free will.
Humans with consciousness that do have free will.
“It’s a question that I dread actually”. Richard and Lawrence suspect free will is nothing more than a very convincing subjective conscious experience of being an automaton, i.e., an illusion – option 2 above.
Logic is the ultimate tool we have – hypothetically, assume that free will does exist, and now also consider that logic cannot be used to explain free will... it follows that something fundamental is missing from our approach to fully understand all of existence.
For example, try to imagine how a subroutine could make a truly free choice?
It's not as if a programmer could program trillions of options based on trillions of possibilities and at some level of complexity the subroutines collectively become conscious and proceed to make a truly free choice... that would mean executing subroutines that break the rules of coding/logic which is impossible – and random values in classical programming are just cleverly scrambled or acquired values, i.e., not true randomness.
Quantum computing might be suggested to use true randomness – but that doesn’t explain or say anything about how free choice might exist as a phenomenon.
Many neuroscientists don’t believe that free will exists – in which case conscious sensations (which of course do exist) could not be acted on by free will, i.e., conscious sensations would effectively have no control (influence) over any of the brain’s actions, which includes evolutionary survival actions as explained previously.
If we assume free will does exist, and also realising that free in this sense must be dynamic, i.e., exists as variables, like x, y, and z are variables, and that logic cannot possibly apply to such variables... then what exactly is free? ... logically speaking? Let's assume free will does not exist – what then is the purpose of consciousness?
If the subjective experience of consciousness serves no purpose in evolutionary decision-making (i.e., no free will), then it means the feeling of being alive (for all animal life) is just along for the ride – you've also never chosen to listen to a song because you like how the sound makes you feel – you've never made a decision to eat something because you like the sensation of how it tastes... do you believe that or not?
Note: there are many variations of all the definitions that follow hereafter, which often overlap as well.
Physicalism: everything in reality is either classically physical (i.e., made of material; tangible stuff), or directly associated with physics, e.g., physical fields, gravity, energy, etc.
“Emergentism” considers consciousness to be an emergent phenomenon that emerges at some unknown level (threshold) of complexity, e.g., via chemistry (structure), or computational state – but that consciousness doesn’t exist for individual atoms or particles – technically, even if consciousness came into existence from just two particles being together... it would still count as emergence.
“Panpsychism” is a concept whereby all physical matter has an amount of consciousness – down to the level of particles, i.e., consciousness is fundamental to existence, e.g., like mass – even a single particle has gravity – but in contrast to gravity, panpsychism is an idea that suggests an amount of consciousness only becomes significant when particles are arranged as representing complex structures, as is the case for emergentism.
Free will via physicalism would require the laws of physics to allow freely logical processes to exist – representing varying degrees of choice as opposed to being deterministic, haphazard, or random.
Dualism: consciousness is thought to exist independent of physical existence (non-physical).
Free will acts according to conscious feelings and sensations, i.e., animals make choices.
Consciousness would need to freely stimulate brain activity in certain regions, which in turn would cause the corresponding physical changes in other regions of the brain – brain activity could involve problem solving and/or controlling the rest of the body.
Example: the free will component itself could be presented with (i.e., experience) the logic (data) of some particular thought that a person is having, and then will the brain’s relevant computational functionality to process thinking (calculate) accordingly, i.e., tasking the brain – the resulting data is then further experienced by the free-component of consciousness, which in turn stimulates the brain’s computational processes... and so on.
Interaction between consciousness and brain activity would need to occur, e.g., via some unknown law of existence.
Emergent consciousness for example, would first emerge, and then freely stimulate brain activity – like a kind of feedback loop, but without a logical description for explaining the physical processes.
The “easy problems” (correlations of behaviour) vs the “hard problem” (subjective experience).
Is consciousness a fundamental property of existence, like space, time, mass, electric charge?
“Panpsychism” refers to the idea that consciousness might be universal, i.e., every system is conscious including individual particles – each particle has an ultra-low level of consciousness – a raw subjective miniscule conscious experience known as a “precursor”.
Christof explains how panpsychism can be considered as the most intellectually plausible explanation of how consciousness exists in the universe.
He makes the point that all lifeforms, which includes insects, humans, whales, dolphins, and elephants, all exist with varying degrees of consciousness; the latter having larger brains than humans – perhaps whales, dolphins, and elephants, are even more conscious than humans... dogs certainly can be.
“... even to a worm it probably feels like something to be alive... the great continuity between lower animals and higher animals; there’s no threshold...”
“... electric charge for instance... it’s not a derived property; it’s an inherent property of certain elementary particles, namely electrons and protons...”
Any conscious experience exists as a whole, i.e., all aspects such as sound, vision, emotions, thoughts, physical sensations, etc., are all effectively merged (“an integrated whole”) into one conscious awareness – but not becoming merged such that their individual distinctive conscious characteristics are severely blurred or lost; but are instead combined... metaphorically speaking... like being superimposed on top of each other whilst at the same time being smoothly joined at the seams within extremely detailed and complex image-like representations of the different conscious states.
The various qualities (flavours) of particular aspects of subjective conscious experience are known as “qualia”, such as different shades of red, or red vs blue, or colours in general vs sound in general, or some particular sound... or the sensation of experiencing understanding – the feeling of learning.
Christof: “Now the theory can explain why for instance – certain parts of the brain are closely associated with consciousness, and others are more peripheral players.”...
Only certain parts of the brain produce significant levels of consciousness. The following page lists various images that show different parts of the brain in detail: “The Seat of Consciousness: High Intellectual Functions Occur in the Cerebrum”
Quote: “The cerebrum is the largest brain structure and part of the forebrain (or prosencephalon). Its prominent outer portion, the cerebral cortex, not only processes sensory and motor information but enables consciousness, our ability to consider ourselves and the outside world.”
Stuart summarises consciousness by expressing its definition – a subjective sensory experience of reality.
He explains consciousness to be a sequence of discrete events, like frames in a movie but which have consciousness built-in to each frame.
Briefly mentions how anaesthetic affects the brain by switching off only the parts that produce consciousness.
Considers looking deeper inside neurons to analyse “microtubules”, i.e., microscopic structures found in the actual neurons (not simply “simple bits”) themselves.
Criticises the computational approach whereby consciousness is thought to emerge at some unknown level of computational complexity (“complexity theory”).
Hameroff makes the point that if consciousness only emerges from and above the level of neurons, then how is it possible that a single-celled organism (a “paramecium”) can perform various tasks? He suggests “Microtubules” make it possible, which also exist in the neurons of human brain chemistry.
Quote: “Hameroff came to believe the microtubule plays a defining role in anesthesia effects — in consciousness. He points to the single-celled paramecium as evidence. “The paramecium has no central nervous system”, he says. “No brain, no neurons, but it swims around, finds food, finds a mate and avoids danger. It seems to make choices, and it definitely seems to process information.”
How? Or more to Hameroff’s point, where? In what part of the paramecium does this crude kind of cognition take place? Hameroff believed he could find the answers in the paramecium’s only internal structure: microtubules, the paramecium’s cytoskeleton.
“Reductionism” is the consideration to physical matter existing as relatively large structures (pieces) of matter, which themselves are made from smaller pieces combined together, e.g., chemistry, quantum mechanics.
If you keep breaking matter into smaller pieces, you’ll ultimately discover the smallest building blocks (particles) that exist, which are themselves indivisible – you’ll have the opportunity to analyse how stuff works at every stage, down to the microscopic level.
Quantum states within microtubules are entangled with other aspects of brain chemistry – the wave function collapses – might this be the origin of consciousness? ... somewhere deeper inside the brain.
Steven states that the microtubule idea as proposed by Roger Penrose (and Stuart Hameroff) is considered to be a non-emergent process...
Although... what exactly does emergent mean?
David explains the difference between weak and strong emergence – on the one hand, an example of weak emergence is how water molecules form waves, i.e., physics in action governing the positional displacement of matter – on the other hand, strong emergence is more profound, such as how consciousness comes into existence via an assembly of particles... so not simply just particles moving around.
Quote: “I think though, that… this term emergence really covers a multitude of sins”.
Perhaps the “intrinsic nature” of the wave function collapsing is consciousness in itself – equivalent to the miniscule phenomenal properties of individual particles as defined via panpsychism.
Conscious phenomena that didn’t exist without the collapse... does exist during or after the collapse for some period of time – logically emergent.
A conscious existence independent of the physical brain, somehow interacts with the brain via microtubules within the neurons – although not necessarily spirit-like, i.e., just some non-physical type of existence that hasn’t yet been comprehended – although if it does pre-exist... then perhaps a new term is required for non-physical things?
A view which considers consciousness to be an emergent phenomenon – ultimately being represented by the given mathematical structures that exist at any one emergence, regardless of the physical material within which the mathematical structures exist. The idea practically relates patterns of particles responsible for information processing as being the cause of consciousness emerging, as opposed to the intrinsic properties of the material substance itself...
“A water droplet is wet” – but an ice crystal and a gas cloud are not wet, even though they consist of the exact same water molecules – the difference is in the arrangement (or “pattern”) of the particles, not the so-called intrinsic nature of the particles within themselves, hence the difference in physical state represents an emergent quality – the laws of physics in action – producing fundamentally different results by using the exact same physical molecule.
Consciousness as an emergent phenomenon is also considered to be analogous to the laws of physics that govern waves for example, partly because waves travel without being directly dependent on the physical medium which they’re travelling through.
Consciousness might only emerge when certain organic chemistry exists, i.e., the patterns themselves at the quantum level might need to be a particular type of physical substance (organic brain matter) for consciousness to emerge.
To exactly reproduce the patterns required for consciousness, might be to reproduce the material substance itself – organic brain matter; neurons themselves as opposed to representing neurons via computer bits, or replicating neural patterns by manipulating non-organic physical structures.
Emergent consciousness seems as feasible as panpsychism, but if emergence only happens at some higher (more complex) level of organic chemistry whereby brain tissue exists (“wet computer”), then it means that mathematical patterns via non-organic physical structures, or computation via man-made computers – might not work at all.
In other words, and hypothetically speaking of course, imagine piecing together a quantum computer 1 particle at a time; you try repeatedly numerous times until it shows conscious behaviour – you look down and see an organic-like substance – you've made a brain.
All conscious life on Earth evolved organically – that same (or similar) organic chemistry might be required to accommodate the necessary patterns of physical matter, from which consciousness emerges, i.e., the chemistry (structure) of neurons themselves – the tissues that surround the neurons might also play an important role in the existence of consciousness.
The key point being emphasised is that “physics doesn’t really tell us what matter is, it really only tells us what it does.” – matter’s dispositional properties.
One version of “Russellian Monism” is the idea that consciousness exists as the intrinsic property of the physical substance itself, i.e., particles themselves actually have their own miniscule experience of reality – which is basically one type of “panpsychism”.
Quote: “it’s our ignorance of the intrinsic nature of matter, that leads us to thinking that consciousness is not physical.” – Philip expresses the idea whereby physical state and the existence of consciousness are “one and the same thing”, i.e., two different ways of talking about nature at its most fundamental level of existence – sometimes philosophised as being the existence within... vs matter’s external structural (tangible) existence.
It’s neither a purely emergent conscious process, whereby consciousness is considered to pop into existence via some large enough piece of matter exceeding some minimum level of complexity within its structure, nor the kind of spiritual-like physically independent entity that is sometimes associated with “dualism”.
In other words, consciousness permanently exists in our physical reality in miniscule individual amounts which exist as the intrinsic nature of each and every particle in the entire universe... so there'd be a finite amount of course.
“Monism” basically means the “oneness” of reality, e.g., one type of vibrating-energy in the universe which produces all physical things via the laws of physics.
The term monism is also used in a variety of subjects that are completely unrelated to both the science of physical structure, and the philosophy of metaphysics.
In particular see: 2:09 to 18:45
“Constitutive panpsychism”: Macro-experiences are grounded in micro-experiences.
Micro-level experiences, e.g., “there’s something it’s like to be a quark” – a type of subatomic particle.
Macro-level experiences, i.e., “micro experiences somehow add up to yield micro experience” – one idea is that although conscious experience for a single particle is virtually non-existent, i.e., extremely small and basic – when thousands, millions, billions, or even trillions of particles are all working together in a complex manner (“the combination problem”), sophisticated levels of consciousness are produced... small animals and humans for example.
“Russellian panpsychism”: “... is this thing that Chalmers is suggesting as an explanation for what the categorical properties of physical entities are; the things that they are intrinsically – and the categorical properties according to this Russellian panpsychist view are the quiddities; the what it’s like properties...”
Quiddities definition: “In scholastic philosophy, "quiddity" (/ˈkwɪdɪti/; Latin: quidditas)[1] was another term for the essence of an object, literally its "whatness" or "what it is".”
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy – (see: “2.f. Quiddities”) “One might suggest that each property has a unique intrinsic qualitative nature known as a quiddity.”
Russellian panpsychism suggests that each different type of physical entity (typically different particles) has its own distinctive type (flavour; intrinsic nature) of micro-consciousness, in contrast to “constitutive panpsychism” which seems to suggest that all micro-size entities have the same type of intrinsic nature.
“Panprotopsychism”: similar to panpsychism, but instead of every individual particle having consciousness permanently, consciousness is thought to emerge when some unknown quantity of particles interact with each other in some way – in contrast to panpsychism, the emergent properties are not identical to the intrinsic properties of particles (not... one and the same thing) – this is conceptually very similar (at least) to emergentism whereby chemistry at some level of complexity becomes “more than the sum of its parts”, i.e., consciousness pops into existence at some unknown threshold.
“Proto-psychic” (mental) properties (proto-consciousness; proto-phenomenal), i.e., potentially conscious, but only when interacting (collectively) with other particles – thereby constituting “true phenomenal” properties.
“... there’s an a priori entailment from truths about proto-phenomenal properties, perhaps along with structural properties, to truths about the phenomenal properties that they constitute. On this view the epistemic gap then is not a gap between the non-phenomenal and the phenomenal, but instead it’s a more specific gap between the structural and the phenomenal.”
By considering proto-phenomenal existences as types of... potential that produce something else – then in themselves they must exist as something – perhaps a special type of energy – an energy that can transform in consciousness...
The structural bonds themselves within atoms are types of energy...
Therefore, both energy types together can be considered as being the total structural energy – the gap then becomes a gap between the structural energy and the phenomenal...
Proto-phenomenal: structural energy that transforms into consciousness.
Atomic structural: energy that binds particles together.
If something becomes more than the sum of its parts which results in a phenomenon that otherwise never existed – then logically speaking it is emergent – but if something transforms into a fundamentally different intrinsic form... well I suppose we could call that Magic!
The ultimate question – why is there anything at all?
Robert interviews several contributors: philosopher of science, astrophysicist, mathematician, philosophical theologian – to ask their opinion about why anything exists at all... “if you put a gun to my head and say answer this question...”
In other words, absolute nothingness means none of the following exist:
Not even the potential for existence in any sense whatsoever.
The same kind of absolute nothingness that refers to there being no beyond the totality of spacetime's outer limits, i.e., our entire cosmos is finite in size.
Ultimately, the answer to this question seems to be fundamentally incomprehensible, i.e., the limited nature of conscious understanding – not a technical limitation, but just what consciousness actually is; its so-called “intrinsic properties”; our subjective phenomenal experience of reality, i.e., the property of consciousness in itself – existing as a particular limited type of thing.